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MULTICULTURAL LAWYERING:
TEACHING PSYCHOLOGY TO DEVELOP
CULTURAL SELF-AWARENESS
CARWINA WENG*
Much of the current literature in multicultural lawyering focuses
on learning substantive information about clients who are culturally
different from the lawyer, such as how the client's culture perceives
eye contact or reacts to science-based world views. This article notes
that such a focus sidesteps the human reality that every person reacts
to people who are different from him- or herself unconsciously in
ways that may be culturally insensitive and discriminatory and that
this human reaction occurs despite awareness of the general values,
attitudes, and beliefs of the client's culture. It therefore suggests that
multicultural lawyering training should begin with the lawyer's self-
analysis of his/her culture and its influences on the lawyer. Such cul-
tural self-awareness is considered in social science to be the key to
multicultural competence, because awareness of one's own culture al-
lows more accurate understanding of cultural forces that affect the
lawyer, the client, and the interaction of the two. Specifically, the arti-
cle offers a framework for learning cultural self-awareness, starting
with the teaching of cognitive and social psychology. This psychol-
ogy would include an understanding of the unconscious mechanisms
by which every person categorizes others and the use every person
makes of these categories as s/he encounters culturally different per-
sons. It also provides real-life examples of how unconscious catego-
rization affects behavior and how cultural self-awareness can enable
more accurate, client-centered lawyering.
The fiftieth anniversary of the decision in Brown v. Board of Edu-
cation1 and the Supreme Court's decisions in the Michigan affirmative
action cases2 have reenergized our national conversation regarding
* Assistant Clinical Professor, Boston College Law School. Thanks to Alexis Ander-
son, Lynn Barenberg, Mithra Merryman, Evangeline Sarda, and Paul Tremblay for their
invaluable comments; to James Nixon for his research assistance; and to Eric Robinson for
his ongoing support and inspiration. Thanks also to BCLS and the Hale & Dorr Endowed
Fund for Legal Education for their generous support of this project.
1 347 U.S. 483 (1954)
2 White applicants who were denied admission to the University of Michigan at Ann
Arbor's undergraduate college and law school sued the university to challenge its affirma-
tive action programs. The undergraduate college used a point-allocation system, by which
racial and ethnic minorities could receive up to 20 points for their racial/ethnic member-
ship. Points also were awarded for academic excellence, as demonstrated by GPA and test
scores, athletic prowess, other talents, geographic diversity, etc. An applicant typically
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diversity. The Court's endorsement of diversity in Grutter v. Bollinger
as "essential" to quality education, preparation for work in a global
economy, cross-racial understanding, and decreasing prejudice 3 was
unexpected. 4 A core premise of this endorsement is that "the skills
needed in today's increasingly global marketplace can only be devel-
oped through exposure to widely diverse people, cultures, ideas, and
viewpoints."' 5 This article considers the implications of the Court's ra-
tionale as well as the rationale that is missing - the ongoing role af-
firmative action plays in redressing past and current discrimination 6 -
for training law students to practice with multicultural competence.
My concerns with the Court's emphasis on exposure to diverse
students are twofold. First, this emphasis ignores ongoing discrimina-
tion faced by members of nondominant cultures. Now, diversity is ac-
ceptable because it helps white students compete in a global
marketplace rather than because it helps to redress past and ongoing
discrimination. 7  Second, by ignoring ongoing discrimination, the
Court's emphasis on exposure suggests that structural diversity8 alone
needed 100 out of 150 points to be admitted right away. The Supreme Court struck down
this system as approximating a quota because the allocation of points did not allow suffi-
ciently individualized review of each applicant. Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 266
(2003). The law school utilized a more individualized, holistic admissions process, with the
goal of achieving a "critical mass" of racial and ethnic minority members. This process was
upheld as constitutional. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 332 (2003).
3 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 324-25.
4 Lyle Denniston, High Court's Course Debated after Rulings Two Key Civil Rights
Decisions Mark Shift from Conservatism, BOSTON GLOBE, June 30, 2003, at A3; Jan Craw-
ford Greenberg, High Court Rulings Stun the Right Decisions on Race, Gays Show Justices'
Knack for Surprise, SUN SENTINEL (Ft. Lauderdale, FL, Broward Co. Metro ed.), June 29,
2003, at 4A; Linda Greenhouse, The Supreme Court: Overview; In a Momentous Term,
Justices Remake the Law, and the Court, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 2003, at Al; Tony Mauro, It's a
Mad, Mad, Mad, Mad Court/Justices Upended Expectations in 2002-2003 Term, TEXAS
LAWYER, July 7, 2003, at 12; and Martin Michaelson, The Court's Pronouncements Are
More Dramatic and Subtle Than the Headlines, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC., July 18, 2003,
at Review 11.
5 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 321 (citations omitted). Justice O'Connor relied on the briefs of
the respondent law school and numerous amici from the business world and the military in
reaching her conclusion. Id. at 334.
6 As Justice Ginsburg noted, "In the wake of 'a system of racial caste only recently
ended', large disparities endure. Unemployment, poverty, and access to health care vary
disproportionately by race. Neighborhoods and schools remain racially divided." Gratz,
539 U.S. at 299-300 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
7 For a discussion of the rise of market-based rationales for diversity in the legal pro-
fession and their effect on social justice and equal opportunity, see generally David B. Wil-
kins, From "Separate is Inherently Unequal" to "Diversity is Good for Business:" The Rise
of Market-Based Diversity Arguments and the Fate of the Black Corporate Bar, 117 HARV.
L. REV. 1548 (2004).
8 Structural diversity refers to the "levels of diversity" in an institution. Brief for the
American Psychological Ass'n as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents, Grutter v.
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-241), available at 2002 US Briefs 241, 17 (2003)
(hereinafter APA amicus brief); Expert Report of Patricia Gurin, Theoretical Foundations
[Vol. 11:369
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could paper over the lasting effects of a history of prejudice and dis-
crimination and create culturally competent workers within one gen-
eration. 9 Such a suggestion minimizes the need for institutional
support for diversity1 ° and acknowledgement that discrimination con-
tinues. Without such support, "[a] campus could be full of minority
students yet still have a segregated environment without meaningful
interactions between different racial and ethnic groups."11 Indeed,
students from culturally diverse backgrounds might face pressure to
contribute diverse cultures, ideas, and viewpoints to the classroom ex-
perience 12 and to be diverse in a way that is "global," or international,
rather than domestically American. 13 In short, an emphasis on expo-
sure alone maintains the perception of diverse students as "the other"
and absolves students in the dominant American culture from under-
standing their own culture and the ways in which that culture - espe-
cially its legacy of discrimination - affects their interactions with other
at 4, Gratz v. Bollinger, 122 F. Supp. 2d 811 (E.D. Mich. 2000) (No. 97-75321) and Grutter
v. Bollinger, 137 F. Supp. 2d 821 (E.D. Mich. 2001) (No. 97-75928), available at http://www.
umich.edu/-urel/admissions/legal/expert/gurintoc.html (last visited July 29, 2004) (herein-
after Gurin Report).
9 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 342. Justice O'Connor evinced the hope that, given the progress
in minority enrollments since the decision in Regents of Univ. of California v. Bakke, 438
U.S. 265 (1978), "25 years from now, the use of racial preferences will no longer be neces-
sary to further the interest approved today." Id. at 343. Justice Thomas went farther still,
opining "While I agree that in 25 years the practices of the law school will be illegal, they
are, for the reasons I have given, illegal now." Id. at 362 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
10 Full institutional support for cultural competence would allow the institution itself to
become culturally competent. For this development to occur, the institution would need to
value diversity, engage in self-assessment of its own culture, develop means to accommo-
date difference, integrate cultural competence into the institution, and adapt to diversity.
Carolyn Copps Hartley & Carrie J. Petrucci, Justice, Ethics, and Interdisciplinary Teaching
and Practice: Practicing Culturally Competent Therapeutic Jurisprudence: A Collaboration
between Social Work and Law, 14. WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 133, 171-73 (2004).
11 APA amicus brief, supra note 8, at 18. The emphasis in the Michigan cases was, of
course, on racial and ethnic diversity. The arguments advanced in these cases as well as in
this article apply as well to a broader definition of diversity.
12 Perry Bacon, Jr., How Much Diversity Do You Want from Me? TIME, July 7, 2003, at
108. Bacon, an African-American journalist at TIME, comments, "O'Connor's diversity
rationale doesn't just pressure colleges to admit more minority students. It gives me and
other underrepresented minority students an added burden: delivering diversity. It cre-
ates expectations that I have a uniquely black viewpoint to contribute and that part of my
responsibility as a student or worker is to do that." Id. In essence, a new stereotype is
being created, and people of color may feel "stereotype vulnerability," or pressure to be-
have in conformity with the stereotype. Marc R. Poirier, Gender Stereotypes at Work, 65
BROOK. L. REV. 1073, 1098-99 (1999).
13 The emphasis on multicultural competence to function in a global marketplace sug-
gests that such competence is necessary to interact with non-Americans, and this sugges-
tion in turn implies that, domestically, all Americans, regardless of cultural background
(racial, ethnic, sexual orientation, socioeconomic class, etc.) are sufficiently uniform as to
cultural background and power that multicultural competence need not be developed as to
them.
Spring 2005]
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individuals.
The literature on developing multicultural competence, fortu-
nately, does not adopt so simplistic a perspective. Empirical studies in
the social sciences support the need for educational initiatives specifi-
cally designed to teach multicultural competence 14 in combination
with meaningful exposure to multicultural interactions. 15 Through
these studies, consensus has arisen that multicultural competence be-
gins with cultural self-awareness. 16 Cultural self-awareness is the key
because it enables us to "recognize that as cultural beings, [we] may
hold attitudes and beliefs that can detrimentally influence [our] per-
ceptions of and interactions with individuals who are ethnically and
racially different from [our]selves.' t7
However, within the newer world of multicultural competence
training for lawyers, "diversity" training for lawyers often replicates
the fallacies of the Grutter decision. At training sessions I have at-
tended, the most common response to why such training is important
is that the clients are ethnically and racially different from the lawyers.
This response is not wrong, but it is superficial. It leads attendees to
clamor for concrete skills18 (how do I interview a client who is cultur-
14 For a comprehensive review and listing of such empirical studies, see Gurin Report,
supra note 8, at Appendix B. See also Cruz Reynoso & Cory Amron, Diversity in Legal
Education: A Broader View, A Deeper Commitment, J. LEGAL EDUC., 491, 503-05 (2002)
(encouraging law schools to "foster pedagogical and curricular innovation" to promote
diversity's values).
15 See, e.g., APA amicus brief, supra note 8, at 12-15 and studies cited therein.
16 See, e.g., American Psychological Ass'n, Guidelines on Multicultural Education,
Training, Research, Practice, and Organizational Change for Psychologists (August 2002),
available at http://www.apa.org/pi/multiculturalguidelines/formats.html (hereinafter APA
Guidelines); Patricia Arredondo & G. Miguel Arciniega, Strategies and Techniques for
Counselor Training Based on the Multicultural Counseling Competencies, J. MULTnCUL-
TURAL COUNSELING AND DEV. 263, 266 (2001); PAUL B. PEDERSEN, CULTURE-CENTERED
COUNSELING INTERVENTIONS: STRIVING FOR ACCURACY 203 (1997); DERALD W. SUE &
DAVID SUE, COUNSELING THE CULTURALLY DIFFERENT: THEORY AND PRACTICE 17 (3d
ed. 1999).
17 APA Guidelines, supra note 16, at 17. The APA places self-awareness as the first of
its guidelines for multicultural counseling. Note that the APA Guidelines deal solely with
racial and ethnic cultural competence. Its strictures, however, also apply to other kinds of
cultural diversity, which are included in this article.
18 See generally Susan Bryant, The Five Habits: Building Cross-Cultural Competence in
Lawyering, 8 CLIN. L. REV. 33 (2001) (espousing the five habits as "a process to avoid
cultural blinders and recover from cultural blunders"); Paul R. Tremblay, Interviewing and
Counseling across Cultures: Heuristics and Biases, 9 CLIN. L. REV. 373 (2002) (offering
"concrete ways to change behavior, especially drawing on other field's exploration of
cross-cultural interaction"). These authors do not ignore the need for cultural self-aware-
ness. Bryant, supra note 18, at 48-63; Michelle S. Jacobs, People from the Footnotes: the
Missing Element in Client-Centered Counseling, 27 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 345, 374-91
(1997); Tremblay, supra note 18, at 385-87, 407-16. Indeed, Tremblay recommends that
lawyers develop some familiarity with cultural identity development theory, which gener-
ally recognizes stages in progression of cultural consciousness. Id. at 414-15. However, it is
[Vol. 11:369
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ally different from me?) and trainers to omit deeper discussions of
multicultural competence, including the connections between culture,
behavior, and discrimination. As a result, much training encourages
attendees to take shortcuts that reinforce the perception of the client
as "the other" and to avoid developing cultural self-awareness. 19
The partial solution I offer today is to teach law students cogni-
tive and social psychology relevant to multicultural lawyering. With
such an understanding, law students and we clinicians might learn how
people absorb information from the cultures we inhabit and encounter
to form social constructions20 about people, how these constructions
might include stereotypes about people different from ourselves, and
how these constructions might lead to (un)conscious discrimination
toward out-group members, even in individuals who consider them-
selves to hold progressive attitudes on diversity.21 We might also
easy to leapfrog over cultural self-awareness, especially as members of a dominant culture
are often unaware that such a culture exists. See infra p. 399.
Other authors have written expressly about the relevant psychology but as a means of
understanding the actions of others, not the attorney herself. See, e.g., STEFAN H. KRIE-
GER & RICHARD K. NEUMANN, JR., ESSENTIAL LAWYERING SKILLS 130-32 (2- D ed. 2003)
(understanding how clients create narratives and how courts and juries perceive them);
Poirier, supra note 12, at 1086-116 (accounting for ongoing gender discrimination in em-
ployment); Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Ap-
proach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161,
1186-217 (1995) (same); Kim Taylor-Thompson, Empty Voices in Jury Deliberations, 113
HARV. L. REV. 1261, 1276-308 (2000) (understanding dynamics of juries that include
women and racial/ethnic minorities). One exception is ROBERT M. BASTRESS & JOSEPH D.
HARBAUGH, INTERVIEWING, COUNSELING, AND NEGOTIATING: SKILLS FOR EFFECTIVE
REPRESENTATION 19-57 (1990), which includes a chapter on "Helping Theories" designed
to assist students to understand themselves as helpers. This chapter does not explicitly
address multicultural lawyering.
19 See infra pp. 383-89.
20 Social constructions are "cultural characterizations or popular images individuals
hold that serve to define certain groups in society." Constructions involving race or ethnic-
ity in particular are strongly held, and the more strongly held a construction is, "the more
resistant are the attitudes associated with [it] to new and contradictory information." Hart-
ley & Petrucci, supra note 10, at 163-64.
21 Given the decrease in conscious discrimination in American society, the unconscious
privilege that members of the dominant American culture, usually whites, typically enjoy
can increase resistance to examining issues of discrimination because exploration of ethno-
centrism "challenges the common and accepted images and messages members of the ma-
jority culture have received since childhood." Id. at 137-38. Yet empirical studies that
measure implicit associations among racial groups and evaluative attributes (for example,
pleasant and unpleasant words) suggest that unconscious and subtle forms of prejudice and
discrimination still exist. These implicit association tests (IAT) ask participants to classify
images representing racial groups and evaluative attributes such as pleasant or unpleasant
words using two designated keys. Participants typically perform the classification more
quickly when pleasant attributes share the same key as White images and when unpleasant
attributes share the same key as Black images. This outcome occurs even among partici-
pants who are aware of the purpose of the test - to measure racist attitudes - and who are
self-avowedly low-prejudiced. Nilanjana Dasgupta et al., Automatic Preference for White
Americans: Eliminating the Familiarity Explanation, 36 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL
Spring 2005]
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learn that the risk of errors in perception and judgment is even greater
in professional settings such as law school clinical programs because of
the power differential between the client (often a poor person of
color) and the attorney, who often has access to more privileges as, for
example, a member of the dominant culture or of a higher socioeco-
nomic status. 22 From this base, we might better appreciate the impor-
tance of cultural self-awareness, especially the examination of the
attitudes, beliefs, and knowledge that create and reinforce social con-
structions that can unconsciously perpetuate discrimination. 23
This article proposes a framework in which to teach law students
to develop self awareness, as a first step toward developing multicul-
tural lawyering competence. The framework operates as both a con-
ceptual underpinning and as a means to lawyer with multicultural
competence, but the article itself focuses on concepts over practice.
The article first reviews the development of client-centered lawyering
and the recognition that dominant models of lawyering may uninten-
tionally discriminate against indigent clients by labeling behaviors
common to them as difficult and atypical. Part two considers the de-
velopment of more inclusive models of lawyering based on develop-
ments in psychotherapy and social work education. Part three
describes cognitive and social psychology relevant to multicultural
lawyering. Finally, Part four uses the lessons of this psychology to
develop a framework for teaching students to develop cultural self-
PSYCHOL. 316, 316-18 (2000) (citations omitted). To take the IAT yourself, visit https://
implicit.harvard.edu/implicit/.
22 See BEA WEHRLY, PATHWAYS TO MULTICULTURAL COUNSELING COMPETENCE: A
DEVELOPMENTAL JOURNEY 171 (1995) (advising psychotherapists to address cultural self-
awareness, including racism, because of the power counselors have over their client's
lives). Power is an important element of discriminatory behavior because the person with
power has the ability to control the person with less power even through unspoken differ-
ences in role, expertise, and cultural dynamics. Id. at 167-68 (citations omitted). Even
when the student attorney is a member of, for example, a racial or ethnic minority, she
acquires aspects of power vis A vis her client due to her role as the professional with spe-
cialized knowledge and skills in the relationship. Cf. Michael Tlanusta Garrett et al., Mul-
ticultural SuperVISION: A Paradigm of Cultural Responsiveness for Supervisors, J.
MULTICULTURAL COUNSELING AND DEV., 147, 148 (2001) (noting that Native American
counselor in supervisory role acts symbolically in dominant position vis A vis White
supervisee). How a client reacts to the student of color wielding actual or perceived power
also will affect their relationship. For example, the client might request direction from a
student lawyer of the same cultural group, based on an expectation that the student lawyer
is better able to navigate and to understand the client's culture and the dominant one.
Conversely, the client might resent the student lawyer's position because the student's age
or gender might otherwise preclude the student from holding that position. See ED
NEUKRUG, THE WORLD OF THE COUNSELOR: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE COUNSELING
PROFESSION 354 (1999).
23 Jacobs, supra note 18, at 391 (active listening, empathy are not sufficient to address
cross-cultural issues; rather, lawyers need to understand why race-linked issues arise). See
infra pp. 391-96.
[Vol. 11:369
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awareness.
I. FROM CLIENT-CENTERED TO MULTICULTURAL LAWYERING
Lawyers are professionals because they are trained in an area
that requires intellectual skill and specialized knowledge. This train-
ing creates a power imbalance in the lawyer-client relationship: the
client supposedly goes to the lawyer for assistance because the lawyer
has expertise the client lacks.24 Thus, in a traditional model of law-
yering, the lawyer controls: she is the one who knows the law and
uses this knowledge to make predictions about the best legal out-
comes and to set legal strategy.25
But the traditional model of lawyering is in many respects unsat-
isfactory. Crafting a good solution to a client's problem could require
familiarity with more than just the relevant legal facts; indeed, famili-
arity with more facts about the client's situation could determine
whether the lawyer even is thinking about the right legal claim. Cli-
ents too might be dissatisfied with directive lawyering: humanized
lawyering accords them more respect and allows them greater control
over the process. 26 So, client-centered models of lawyering have de-
veloped. The first model, promulgated by Binder and Price,27 (herein-
after the Binder-Price model) recognizes that the client has superior
knowledge about her values, goals and situation, which will enable her
to better choose a satisfactory resolution.2 8 Thus, client-centered law-
yering attempts to shift the power imbalance by engaging the client as
a participant in the lawyering process.2 9
However, the original formulation of client-centered lawyering
was often inapt, at least as applied to clients many students encounter
in clinical and legal services practice. Critics noted that the Binder-
Price model conceptualized the client as a copy of the lawyer, minus
the legal know-how. This copy shared the lawyer's socioeconomic sta-
tus, perspective, organizational modes, etc. - for example, related his
24 Bastress & Harbaugh, supra note 18, at 283 (reminding students that the lawyer-
client relationship "necessarily renders the client susceptible to manipulation by the law-
yer" due to the lawyer's control of the structure, agenda, and knowledge of the law). Bas-
tress and Harbaugh warn that "domination and manipulation can only be avoided by
persistent and conscientious self-control by the more powerful party." Id.
25 DAVID A. BINDER et al., LAWYERS AS COUNSELORS: A CLIENT-CENTERED AP-
PROACH 4 (2nd ed 2004) (hereinafter Lawyers as Counselors).
26 Id. at 4-8.
27 DAVID A. BINDER & SUSAN C. PRICE, LEGAL INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELING: A
CLIENT-CENTERED APPROACH (1977).
28 LAWYERS AS COUNSELORS, supra note 25, at 5; Krieger & Neuman, supra note 18, at
22.
29 LAWYERS AS COUNSELORS, supra note 25, at 8; Krieger & Neuman, supra note 18, at
22-23.
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situation in clear, chronological order - and thus was ready, willing,
and able to participate in the lawyering model promulgated by Binder
and Price.30 Other clients, who might ramble, evince reluctance to
discuss certain topics or to commence an interview, lie, or display an-
ger or hostility were, in the Binder-Price parlance, "difficult" and
"atypical." 31
The early Binder-Price model does offer some explanation as to
why clients might be "difficult," but the reasons do not take into ac-
count culture, whether based on race, socioeconomic status, or other
factors, except age.32 The model thus ignores the fact that culture and
other power and privilege differences also affect the client's participa-
tion in the lawyering relationship. 33 I recall, for example, a woman
client who told me on our way to renew her restraining order that I
could not understand her situation as a homeless survivor of domestic
violence, who bounced from shelter to shelter with a small bag of
clothes, because I have a loving husband and drove a new car. Her
statement forced me to consider what motivated the perception, and I
realized that she equated me with the other privileged and powerful
service providers in her life, who were investigating and seemingly
judging her life and behavior. I therefore adjusted my lawyering by
acknowledging explicitly the class and personal differences between
us, reminding her repeatedly that she had the authority to set the
goals and direction for her case, and asking her more about her life
with her husband, both the good and the bad, and her interests and
concerns. By making these adjustments, I gave the client room to re-
veal her goals, interests, and concerns to me, and she confided that she
had been maintaining the restraining order only because the Depart-
ment of Social Services wanted her to do so. In the comfort of our
improved relationship, the client vacated the restraining order, with
me at her side in support.34
30 Jacobs, supra note 18, at 349-53; Ann Shalleck, Constructions of the Client within
Legal Education, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1731, 1742-48 (1993).
31 LAWYERS AS COUNSELORS, supra note 25, at 247-68.
32 The current edition of LAWYERS AS COUNSELORS does address issues of multicultural
counseling explicitly. See, e.g., LAWYERS AS COUNSELORS, supra note 25, at 32-40. It also
intersperses cultural issues throughout the book by, for example, using ethnic names in
hypotheticals (p. 13, 140, 323 and throughout) and acknowledging that cultural values
might affect participation in decision making (p. 10).
33 Shalleck, supra note 30, at 1742-48. By contrast, social work education emphasizes
that students be aware of how their clients' history of discrimination affects them in their
interactions with the social worker as well as with groups and organizations. Social work
education, therefore, recognizes that, "to interact effectively with clients, particularly in a
multicultural context, the client perspective must also be acknowledged, whether it is sup-
ported by research or not." Hartley & Petrucci, supra note 10, at 144.
34 A typical reaction to an anecdote like this is that I did what a good lawyer ought to
do anyway. My response is, yes, that's correct. After all, in my view, multicultural law-
[Vol. 11:369
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In "Constructions of the Client within Legal Education," Anne
Shalleck points out that this undifferentiated model of client-centered
lawyering in fact maintains the lawyer as the dominant player. She
notes that the model favors a chronological narrative over other forms
of storytelling, depends on the lawyer to determine the importance of
both legal and nonlegal concerns, assumes a standardized client, and
ignores power imbalances. 35 Thus, the Binder-Price model "uses the
lawyer-client relationship to construct the interests and motivations of
clients through criteria the law controls. 36
Concerns about a "one-size-fits-all" training model arose among
mental health professionals before they arose among law clinicians. 37
Derald and David Sue warned that an "ethnocentric" model of coun-
seling teaches students to practice in a way that can harm their cli-
ents.38 The model views the experiences of clients of color "from the
'White, European-American perspective' . . . . [and] the focus tends to
be on their pathological lifestyles and/or a maintenance of false ste-
reotypes. '39 For example, a counselor might view a patient's reluc-
tance to self-disclose as paranoia, when in fact that reluctance might
be "a healthy reaction to racism" from the counselor.40 The counselor
might also "overshadow" a client's job-related problems with personal
ones, resulting in an underdiagnosis of psychopathology.41 Thus,
yering is good lawyering. The difference is being explicit that culture matters so that a
lawyer might clear up some of the assumptions occurring in both directions and make
adjustments sooner, more readily, and more appropriately.
35 Shalleck, supra note 30, at 1742-48.
36 Id. at 1747.
37 SUE & SUE, supra note 16, at 11-12, discussing studies dating from the late 1970s in
clinical and counseling psychology that indicated the failure of the profession to "meet the
particular mental health needs" of people of color.
38 Id. at 12. Sue and Sue explored, for example, cultural differences in support struc-
tures and decision making that could lead to misunderstandings in the therapy relationship.
39 Id. at 12. Charles R. Ridley reminds us that "judgment [about diagnoses, treatment,
referrals, etc.] is biased in the direction of preexisting stereotypes when the material to be
judged is ambiguous or complex," as it typically is in counseling and lawyering relation-
ships. He therefore warns counselors "to be alert, not only to biases in judgment, but also
to their personal biases as judges." CHARLES R. RIDLEY, OVERCOMING UNINTENTIONAL
RACISM IN COUNSELING AND THERAPY: A PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE TO INTENTIONAL IN-
TERVENTION 54-55 (1995).
40 Id. at 62-65. Ridley describes "cultural paranoia" as "a healthy reaction to racism.
The minority client who fears the White counselor and avoids self-disclosure fits this cate-
gory." By contrast, "functional paranoia" is "an unhealthy psychological condition. Mi-
nority clients who have a pervasive suspicion fit this category. They would not disclose to
any counselor regardless of race." Id. at 63.
41 Id. at 59. Diagnostic overshadowing is defined as "the tendency of counselors to use
one diagnosis to obscure or minimize the importance of another diagnosis. In such cases,
counselors underdiagnose psychopathology and minimize the client's need for treatment."
Ridley provides the example of a Native American college sophomore at a predominantly
White university who seeks counseling at a time when she is having problems selecting a
major. The counselor chooses to focus on the student's efforts to adjust to the university
Spring 2005]
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mental health professionals also clearly recognized that an ethnocen-
tric model of practice, combined with a power imbalance in favor of
the professional, creates a system that permits replication of societal
discrimination. 42
Small wonder, then, that Michelle Jacobs should find the Binder-
Price client-centered model troubling when applied to the primary
consumer at her clinic, namely poor, black clients.4 3 Jacobs reminds
us that clients labeled difficult by textbooks espousing client-centered
lawyering might be resisting the lawyer's invitation to participate in
the lawyering process.44 Rather than dismiss the client as difficult,
lawyers need to ask ourselves why the client might be resisting our
invitation. Might the client's response be a reaction to behavior by
the lawyer who fails to recognize "the real client in her full context -
culturally, politically and economically? '45 Or based on the client's
perception of a lawyer who is culturally different from her?
In the legal arena, as Jacobs warned, attorneys who learn an eth-
nocentric model may be ill-equipped to perceive and understand dif-
ferent values and world views presented by their clients. These
blinders - often unconscious and unintentional - can result in a law-
yer's misperception of culturally-based behaviors by her client or of
her client's reactions to the lawyer's own culturally-based behaviors.
They can affect the lawyer's ability to build trust and, therefore, the
information the client chooses to share.46 They also can determine
how the lawyer frames the client's legal problem and directs the strat-
egy.4 7 We thus end up with lawyers trained to consider clients who do
rather than on the student's need to select a major. In so doing, the counselor may over-
look concerns about, for example, choosing not to major in Native American studies, un-
certainty about sciences versus humanities, or more specific concerns related to a major.
Id.
42 Wehrly, supra note 22, at 167-68 (recognizes that power imbalance in therapeutic
relationship and cultural dynamics gives counselor power to perpetuate oppression)
43 Jacobs, supra note 18, at 352-53 (model creates an "essentialist" client, i.e., a stan-
dardized one that does not take into account people at the bottom of social hierarchy)
44 Id. at 355-61 (critiquing client behaviors considered to be problematic through a ra-
cial culture lens)
45 Id. at 352-53, 355. Charles Ridley points out that, "Many counselors are ineffective
with minority clients because they fail to see the 'big picture.' They overlook societal fac-
tors that influence the behavior and adjustment of these clients." He therefore recom-
mends that counselors learn of external pressures their clients encounter, such as racism
and economic and educational disadvantages. Ridley, supra note 39, at 12. In addition, the
counselor can ask the client (without judging him) the reason for the behavior so that the
counselor can understand the client's response and attempt different means to facilitate
client participation.
46 Anthony A. Alfieri, Stances, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1233, 1249 (1992); Jacobs, supra
note 18, at 389.
47 Jacobs, supra note 18, at 380-81, 391.
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not fit the model to be at best difficult and at worst pathological.48
Consider the following situation: a white student whom I super-
vised was representing an African American client in a public housing
eviction proceeding for nonpayment of rent. The client had told the
intake worker that the rent claimed due was not owed because the
housing authority had failed to grant her a legally mandated, 12-
month freeze on rent once she stopped receiving public assistance
benefits and began working. We accepted her case for intake. Later,
the client told the student that, in fact, she owed about an additional
year's worth of rent because she had not paid the rent that was based
on her public assistance income. The student was dumbfounded at the
client's earlier fabrication and at the fact that the client had not paid
rent when, technically, she had the income to do so. The student con-
tinued the interview, asking questions about the rent that was due.49
The client told the student that she had made efforts to pay the rent
but that money orders had been lost or stolen and she no longer had
the money order receipts.
After the interview, the student came to me to process the client's
revelations. In our discussion, we learned that the student's concep-
tion of a legal client was her mother, who was involved in a minor civil
case at the time and whom the student could not conceive of lying to
her lawyer or not paying a bill. Through further discussion, we consid-
ered reasons for the client's initial lie, including the possibility that the
client had lied to obtain a scarce intake interview. Somewhat com-
forted with this possibility, the student proceeded to fashion a theory
and negotiation strategy for a low-amount, long payment plan based
on the information the client had given.
Later, after the student had left the clinic and I was preparing for
the court hearing, the client told me that she had not paid rent, not
because she had lost the money orders, but because she was fed up
with the paternalistic, racist, and often hostile attitude of her housing
manager. She was unwilling to negotiate with him but instructed me
to offer a shorter, higher-level payment plan to the housing authority
lawyer who had instructed the housing manger to implement the post-
public assistance rent freeze. She based this instruction on her willing-
ness to work with a lawyer with whom she did not have a contentious
history and on her desire to show her manager that she was a good
and worthy tenant.
48 SUE & SUE, supra note 16, at 12.
49 The student never asked the client why she had lied. Few students and lawyers prob-
ably would have. Had the student done so in a nonjudgmental manner, her interest in the
client's motivations might have repaired harm that might have occurred from the initial
reaction of judgment and assumption.
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The client and I did not discuss the changes in negotiation strat-
egy from the strategy she had authorized the student to conduct.
Speculation on her motivation, however, raises questions about
whether unintended discrimination (Race? Class?) affected the cli-
ent's interactions with the student. It is possible that the client could
have picked up the student's judgmental reaction to the client's lie,
felt in that judgment a replication of the dynamic she experienced
with the housing manager, and then explained her rent arrears as the
product of external mischance (lost/stolen money orders) to maintain
a portrayal of herself as a client worthy of assistance. With me, possi-
bly because I was the supervisor 50 or a person of color or otherwise
(perceived to be) more accepting of the client's circumstances and
motivations, the client shared a different aspect of herself - a person
with dignity and awareness of the racism she faced - and instructed me
accordingly. At the same time, regardless of who her lawyer was, the
client maintained control of her interest - demonstrating her worth as
a tenant/client. What changed was her willingness to be explicit about
her motivation.
This case and Jacobs' and Shalleck's critiques raise questions
about how well the standard model of client-centered lawyering works
with clients who are disenfranchised and often economically and ra-
cially/ethnically diverse from their lawyers. Even though client-cen-
tered lawyering focuses on respecting and empowering the client, it
does not address the dynamics of power and subordination (historical,
actual, or perceived) in the attorney-client interaction. Thus, sugges-
tions to improve client-centered lawyering also draw on the theory of
rebellious lawyering and theoretics of practice to change the underly-
ing discourse between lawyer and client.51 With rebellious lawyering,
the emphasis is on the client: how the client's life - including her
membership in an outsider group and her group's history of subordi-
nation - defines the legal problem, generates the solutions, and deter-
mines the course of action.52 With this emphasis, the client might
50 I consider my position as a clinical supervisor to be part of my cultural makeup
because my experience as a supervisor in a legal services practice in New York City and
Boston have given me a cultural perspective and set of values that I hope is more open to
issues of poverty, race, and other differences. In addition, it is possible that the client
reacted to me differently because of culturally-based expectations of a person with higher
lawyer status.
51 Jacobs, supra note 18, at 402-05; Shalleck, supra note 30, at 1748-51.
52 Gerald P. Lopez, Reconceiving Civil Rights Practice: Seven Weeks in the Life of a
Rebellious Collaboration, 77 GEO. L.J. 1603, 1608 (1989). See also Jacobs, supra note 18, at
402-03 ("We cannot allow our students to practice on a client without seeing the client's
reality."); and Shalleck, supra note 30, at 1749-50 (describes rebellious lawyering as using a
client's stories to solve problems, by accepting the client's knowledge and experience as
part of the legal action).
(Vol. 11:369
HeinOnline  -- 11 Clinical L. Rev. 380 2004-2005
Lawyer Know Thyself
more effectively participate as an equal in the decision-making
process.53
With theoretics of practice, the emphasis is on the lawyer: how
can the lawyer understand the "assumptions, biases, values, and
norms embedded in the law's workings in order to heighten awareness
of the political and moral choices made by lawyers and the legal sys-
tem"?54 How can the lawyer "listen[] to and describ[e] clients in a
way that does not impose upon them categories constructed by
lawyers"? 55
Both rebellious lawyering and theoretics of practice describe ap-
proaches to bridging the gap - cultural and power-based - between
lawyers and clients who are different from each other. Building this
bridge is not an easy task. Empathy and active listening may elicit
more details from the client, and questioning the premises of the
American legal system may help the lawyer consciously to avoid its
biases. But the lawyer's cultural lens will operate automatically to fil-
ter this information and to create expectations about the lawyer-client
interaction. So, unless the lawyer understands her own culture and
the ways it affects her interactions with others, she risks perpetuating
the status quo of discrimination. 56
More recently, concerns about the human impact of lawyering
has led to developments in "the comprehensive law movement, ' 57
which have implications for addressing the culture gap between law-
yer and client. The movement has not developed specifically as a re-
sponse to this gap, but rather out of a concern that law exacts a heavy
price on lawyers, clients, and others involved in litigation.58 Overall,
53 Lopez, supra note 52, at 1608. Jacobs, supra note 18, at 402-03.
54 Phyllis Goldfarb, Beyond Cut Flowers: Developing a Clinical Perspective on Critical
Legal Theory, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 717, 719-22 (1992).
55 Shalleck, supra note 30, at 1751.
56 APA Guidelines, supra note 16, at 21. WANDA M.L. LEE, AN INTRODUCTION TO
MULTICULTURAL COUNSELING 15 (1999). A counselor who is not culturally self-aware
risks "cultural encapsulation," or viewing the world from only her cultural lens. TRACY L.
ROBINSON & MARY F. HOWARD-HAMILTON, THE CONVERGENCE OF RACE, ETHNICITY,
AND GENDER: MULTIPLE IDENTITIES IN COUNSELING 11 (2000). Cultural encapsulation is
dangerous because it can cause errors in interpretation, strategy, and communication. Lee,
supra note 56, at 15.
57 The "comprehensive law movement," a term coined by Susan Daicoff, refers to ten
"theoretical and practice-based approaches ... that aim to 'optimize[ ] human well-being'
and focus[ ] on 'extra-legal concerns,' including the emotions of those involved and rela-
tionships." Hartley & Petrucci, supra note 10, at 135, quoting Susan Daicoff, The Role of
Therapeutic Jurisprudence within the Comprehensive Law Movement in PRACTICING THER-
APEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE: LAW AS A HELPING PROFESSION 465-67 (Dennis P. Stolle et al.
eds., 2000). The ten approaches are preventive law, therapeutic jurisprudence, procedural
justice, restorative justice, facilitative mediation, transformative mediation, holistic law,
collaborative law, creative problem solving, and specialized courts. Id. at 135 n. 12.
58 See generally Susan Daicoff, The Comprehensive Law Movement, 19 TouRo L. REV.
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the comprehensive law movement utilizes humanistic and interdisci-
plinary approaches to reconceptualize the lawyer's and the legal sys-
tem's interactions with the client in ways that consider explicitly the
client's context. This concern can lead to a focus on client context,
which encompasses a client's cultural and other group membership.
Because the movement seeks in part to improve contextualized out-
comes for clients, it draws on generalist social work59 methods to im-
prove lawyer-client relationships and the effectiveness and reputation
of legal systems.60 A generalist social work model trains the profes-
sional to interact with clients at the individual, small group, and
agency or community levels so that the "organizational context" of the
client is integral to any interaction. 61 As part of that contextual inter-
action, the client's culture is vital, and the professional must learn to
interact in a client-centered, 62 culturally competent manner. 63
Training in multicultural lawyering brings together the ap-
proaches championed by rebellious lawyering, theoretics of practice,
and the comprehensive law movement by "combin[ing] personal
growth with content learning and skill development. '64 As a starting
point, multiculturalists focus on a broad understanding of culture as
"unstated assumptions, shared values, and characteristic ways of per-
ceiving the world that are normally taken for granted by its mem-
bers."'65 Multicultural lawyering training teaches the student to be
825, 825-35 (2004).
59 A generalist social worker has "'knowledge and skills [that] encompass a broad spec-
trum and [ I assess[es] problems and their solutions comprehensively."' Hartley & Pe-
trucci, supra note 10, at 140 n.43 quoting ROBERT L. BARKER, THE SOCIAL WORK
DICTIONARY 190 (4th ed. 1999)
60 Id. at 135.
61 Id. at 140-41.
62 In social work, client-centeredness entails "'be[ing] where the client is."' Id. at 143.
Thus, if the client believes that she experiences discrimination in her daily interactions,
then the professional must acknowledge that perspective to be effective in working with
the client. Id. at 144.
63 Id. at 141.
64 Lee, supra note 56, at 196. "'The cognitive distance between the mental health ser-
vice providers and the lower class and minority consumers can be bridged through didactic
instruction, but the social and emotional distance can be reduced only through an intensive
program of reeducation of the counselors, one aimed at changing their attitudes."' Id. at
196 (quotation omitted). But see RIDLEY, supra note 39, at 24-25: "Consciousness raising
is an inadequate method of combating racism." Instead, Ridley advocates changing racist
behavior because behavior is easier to change. Id. at 24-25.
65 ROBINSON & HOWARD-HAMILTON, supra note 56, at 11 (quotation omitted). Bryant
provides a list of factors that influence culture, including "ethnicity, race, gender, national-
ity, age, economic status, social status, language, sexual orientation, physical characteris-
tics, marital status, role in family, birth order, immigrant status, religion, accent, skin
color." Bryant, supra note 18, at 41. This article accepts these factors as cultural influences
but notes that race, ethnicity, and national origin remain particularly salient in American
culture.
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aware of the cultural basis for his own behavior and champions using
"a 'cultural lens' as a central focus of professional behavior . . .
recogniz[ing] that all individuals including themselves are influenced
by different contexts, including the historical, ecological, sociopoliti-
cal, and disciplinary. '66 Thus, the student develops a "personal-cul-
tural orientation" toward lawyering in which she considers how her
and others' behavior is guided by culturally learned expectations and
values. 67 With such knowledge and regular practice, the student is
better equipped to develop more accurate decision making that is less
biased by the cultural backgrounds of either the lawyer or the client or
by the complexity of the problem presented.68
II. CURRENT METHODS OF TEACHING
MULTICULTURAL LAWYERING
To develop this personal-cultural orientation, multicultural coun-
seling trainers recommend a three-fold approach: developing aware-
ness and knowledge of one's own culture; developing awareness of the
client's culture; and learning specific skills to minimize the impact of
one's own biases and prejudices toward the multicultural interaction. 69
Within each of these domains, students focus on becoming competent
cognitively, affectively, and behaviorally. 70
By contrast, some of the literature of multicultural lawyering em-
phasizes developing awareness of the client's culture, without delving
into developing cultural self-awareness. For example, Stefan Krieger
and Richard Neumann urge that students acquire "an instinct for situ-
ations where another person's cultural assumptions may be very dif-
ferent from yours."'71 To develop this instinct, they suggest a three-
step process: (1) learn about the other cultures an attorney is most
likely to encounter; (2) anticipate situations in which taking culture
66 APA Guidelines, supra note 16, at 11.
67 Both common sense and empirical studies support the proposition that culturally
learned beliefs about differences among cultural groups affect interpersonal interactions
across groups. Hartley & Petrucci, supra note 10, at 162. These beliefs need not be stereo-
types but are often social constructions, or "cultural characterizations or popular images
individuals hold that serve to define certain groups in society." Id. at 163-64. "The more
strongly held the social construction, the more resistant are the attitudes associated with
the construction to new and contradictory information." Id. at 164.
68 Bryant, supra note 18, at 56; RIDLEY, supra note 39, at 56.
69 Arredondo & Arciniega, supra note 16, at 266. SUE & SUE, supra note 16, at 224-25.
The benefit of this approach is that it is a competence model - in contrast with earlier
models, which "suggest something or someone needs to be fixed," Arredondo &
Arciniega, supra note 18, at 265-66 - and thus "provides guidelines and developmental
benchmarks for adaptive cognitive, emotional, and behavioral attributes." Id. at 266.
70 Id. at 265-66; Bryant, supra note 18, at 48; ROBINSON & HOWARD-HAMILTON, supra
note 56, at 272; SUE & SUE, supra note 16, at 17.
71 KRIEGER & NEUMANN, supra note 18, at 53.
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into account will improve lawyering and plan non-stereotyped, non-
offensive behavior; and (3) apologize in a prompt and straightforward
manner if a mistake occurs. 72 Thus awareness of the other, rather
than of the self, takes precedence.
Paul Tremblay, like Krieger and Neumann, urges lawyers to an-
ticipate the most likely areas of cultural differences and the way these
differences affect the multicultural interaction. But whereas Krieger
and Neumann do not detail cultural differences, Tremblay identifies
six areas in which differences are most likely to occur - proxemics,73
kinesics, 74 time and priority considerations, 75 narrative preferences,76
relational perspectives, 77 and scientific orientation.78 Tremblay posits
that knowledge of cultural differences in these areas will assist the
lawyer in avoiding cultural blunders. 79
The law students I work with tend to turn first to this kind of
substantive cultural training when working with a client who appears
racially or ethnically different from themselves. This inclination is not
wrong, but too narrow a focus on knowledge of cultural difference
carries several risks. A 1992 study by Stephan and Stephan reveals
that one risk of a narrow focus is anxiety about difference affecting
interaction. In this study, the authors followed a group of American
students going to Morocco, to consider how the students handled im-
mersion in a new culture.80 The students received lectures on cultural
differences and classes on the history and culture of Morocco prior to
their arrival. However, upon their arrival in Morocco, this instruction
did not improve the students' interactions. Instead, the study deter-
mined that the students' increased awareness of the differences be-
tween the cultures, of their own cultural incompetence, and of the
72 Id.
73 Tremblay, supra note 18, at 389-92 ("'perception and use of personal and interper-
sonal space"')
74 Id. at 392-95 ("way in which bodily movements are used and interpreted;" i.e. ex-
pressions, eye contact, hand shakes, posture, gestures)
75 Id. at 395-96.
76 Id. at 396-99.
77 Id. at 400-03 (individual vs. collective orientations)
78 Id. at 403-06 (acceptance or not of science e.g., medicine through science or faith)
79 Id. at 385-86. Tremblay also warns students to beware the trap of book knowledge.
He labels his suggestions "heuristics" to emphasize the necessity of "train[ing] lawyers in
the discipline of naivetd and in accepting the tentativeness of our assumptions, with 'in-
formed not-knowing."' Id. at 407. He also advises students to cultivate their own cultural
identities, including acknowledging biases and oppression that their culture contains. Id. at
414.
80 The study was conducted by Stephan and Stephan to determine how empathy and
attributional complexity (the tendency to attribute complex causes to other's behavior)
affect immersion in a new culture. Jacobs, supra note 18, at 398-401.
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pitfalls in navigating the culture increased the students' anxiety. 8A1 Ste-
phan and Stephan hypothesize in part that a better instructional
method, namely a combination of lectures and simulation, would
more effectively help students to interact with a culture different from
their own by allowing the students to practice using the substantive
cultural knowledge they had acquired. 82
Many students react to a culturally different client with an anxi-
ety similar to that of the students' in the Stephan and Stephan study.
That anxiety then can manifest in multiple ways: as unconscious
avoidance - the student who postpones meeting with a disability client
diagnosed with Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder for fear of asking ques-
tions about the illness and having to cope with the client's responses;
or tentativeness during the interaction - the student who self-con-
sciously shies away from eye contact with an Asian-American client;
or overeagerness - the student who recalls her repertoire of high-
school Spanish to greet a Guatemalan client.83 These reactions are
counterproductive; they overemphasize the cultural differences be-
tween lawyer and client and, therefore, interfere with the creation of a
secure, nonjudgmental environment in which the lawyer and client
can interact. 84
A second risk is that a focus on cultural knowledge can give stu-
dents "a false sense of accomplishment '85 that the acquisition alone of
such knowledge enables them to work with members of that particular
culture.86 This sense can cause students to resist exploring their own
81 Id. at 400.
82 Id. at 400-01. This combination of substance knowledge and simulation, of course, is
central to clinical pedagogy.
83 At first glance, the effort to communicate with a client in his primary language might
not seem culturally insensitive, as the student intends the exchange to respect the client's
culture and to put him at ease. However, the impact on the client might be quite different.
As Lisa Navareete of the National Council of La Raza commented after the first Demo-
cratic presidential candidates' debate held in Albuquerque, NM, on September 4, 2003,
regarding the candidates' efforts at Spanish, ""Speaking Spanish is nice,... [b]ut it's not
really what the Latino community is looking for, and it's not what they're going to vote
on." "iQuidn es m6s gringo?" BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 7, 2003, at A26.
84 Wehrly points out that substantive knowledge of the client's culture is helpful as a
means of establishing the counselor's credibility with the client: does the counselor prove
to be an "effective and trustworthy helper" by appropriately using the substantive knowl-
edge and giving something of value to the client at each session? WEHRLY, supra note 22,
at 172.
85 Id. at 140.
86 The "cookbook approach" to diversity training - chapter 1 Working with African
Americans; chapter 2 Working with Latinos, etc. - can lead students to "'buy into' the
content of a particular manuscript or 'expert."' Id. at 172. The prevalence of such manu-
scripts and their often unavoidable length in multicultural competence manuals lend fur-
ther credence to their importance that can outweigh the brief warnings not to accept whole
cloth generalizations about cultural differences. See, e.g., LAwYERS AS COUNSELORS, supra
note 25, at 32-40 (the section on stereotyping consists of approximately one page of text
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cultures and attitudes toward other cultural groups87 and can reinforce
the notion of the client as "the other." If, however, a student under-
stands her relationship to her own culture and the ways that culture
creates or reinforces stereotypes, she might not presume that informa-
tion on cultural differences is accurate for a given client, and she
might alter her lawyering to fit the actual client, not the essentialized
one.
For example, a student who had a Central American woman cli-
ent seeking a divorce worried that the client might not feel entitled to
any marital property because the student had heard that Latina
women generally had a different conception of marital property than
the one espoused by Massachusetts divorce law. The student there-
fore planned a counseling session to educate the client about Massa-
chusetts law and empower her to ask for her legal entitlement. I
encouraged the student not to assume that the client held this belief
but to inquire directly of the client before she launched her planned
counseling. The student did inquire of the client, and the client indi-
cated a very strong sense of entitlement to marital property, including
payment of debt.
A third risk is that the student who is unaware of his own culture
may not examine his reactions to information about a different culture
for unconscious biases or prejudices that impair cultural competence.
An infamous example of the use of cultural information in a manner
that reinforced cultural stereotypes occurred in the case of Dong Lu
Chen, a Chinese immigrant8 8 who had killed his wife with a claw ham-
mer because he believed she was having an affair. 89
but the section describing cultural differences necessarily takes more space, here approxi-
mately three pages). Pedersen warns against the "presumption that multiculturalism in
counselor education is merely accumulating additional knowledge about other cultures,
without regard to the underlying assumptions or the consequent skills that are necessary."
Pedersen, supra note 16, at 209 (citation omitted). Similarly, Bryant warns that, as stu-
dents "learn specific cultural rules, [they] have to be careful to apply them correctly and to
guard against substituting them for information about the client." Bryant, supra note 18, at
86-87. Some of the risks a cookbook approach entails are that obstacles that arise in the
lawyering relationship might be attributed to personal difference rather than institutional
practice and preference and that these differences might be seen as deficiencies that leave
intact White American culture as the norm. See Lisa C. Ikemoto, Racial Disparities in
Health Care and Cultural Competency, 48 ST. Louis U. L. J. 75, 100 (2003) (noting that
cultural competence training that "describes a set body of 'facts' about the exotic other can
reinscribe existing stereotypes").
87 WEHRLY, supra note 22, at 140 (citation omitted).
88 Chen and his wife had been living in the United States for approximately one year
when he killed her. Leti Volpp, (Mis) Identifying Culture: Asian Women & the "Cultural
Defense," 17 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 57, 65 (1994). I base the discussion that follows on
Volpp's account of the trial and sentencing hearing.
89 People v. Dong Lu Chen, No. 87-7774 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 2, 1988). This article does
not discuss the merits of using a cultural defense, as does Volpp's article. Rather, this
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At the bench trial, Chen's attorney presented a "cultural de-
fense:" that Chinese values about adultery, community, and saving
face had caused Chen to kill his wife and, therefore, that Chen had
acted without criminal intent.90 The defense came in through the tes-
timony of a white male anthropologist, Burton Pasternak. 91 Pasternak
posited that a Chinese male would react to adultery by his wife "in a
much more volatile, violent way" than an American male like himself
would.92 He further pontificated that the Chinese values of the sanc-
tity of family and the need for collective social control over the behav-
ior of individuals effectively required a man to act against an
adulterous wife to reaffirm the cultural values, to reassert control over
his wife, and, through these corrective measures, to maintain his desir-
ability as a partner to other Chinese women.93 Indeed, Pasternak as-
serted that these values were so prevalent that they effectively were
voices that Chen carried with him constantly. 94 Pasternak added that
a Chinese male cuckold in the United States would suffer even more
than he would in China because he would not be able to find a white
woman partner due to sexual stereotypes regarding Chinese men and,
as a "pariah"' within the Chinese-American community, would be un-
able to find a new Chinese partner or general support. 95
On its face, the legal strategy employed by Chen's attorney, Stew-
art Orden, might appear to epitomize multicultural lawyering. The
strategy, after all, took into consideration the defendant's cultural
background and attempted to explain that background (at least as de-
picted by Pasternak) to the court to benefit the client legally. 96 How-
ever, a primary goal of multicultural lawyering is applying generalized
article considers how the expert's testimony and his audience's reaction to it were filtered
through each one's cultural lens.
90 Volpp, supra note 88, at 64.
91 Pasternak may have been a dubious expert. On cross examination, he cited as
sources for his depiction of Chinese culture fieldwork he had conducted from the 1960s to
1980s, including some incidents he had seen or heard about. He failed, however, to re-
member even his own articles on the subject. Id. at 70. His qualifications and the court's
acceptance of them point out the difficulty of determining the reliability of cultural infor-
mation and raise questions about how a person decides to accept generalized cultural
information.
92 Id. at 66 (citations omitted). Pasternak in fact identified himself as an "average
American." Id. at 70 (citation omitted).
93 Id. at 68-69 (citation omitted). Pasternak implicitly assumed that Chinese women
also accept this cultural view.
94 Id. at 68 (citation omitted).
95 Id. at 69-70 (citation omitted).
96 Indeed, the defense strategy might have reflected Mr. Chen's preference. For in-
stance, the defendant, who apparently had heard voices since 1968 - id. at 64 (citation
omitted) - might have been unwilling to plead insanity due to an aversion to being labeled
insane or to being held in a psychiatric facility should an insanity defense succeed or to
serving a long(er) prison sentence.
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cultural knowledge accurately in light of an individual's circum-
stances. 97 The cultural defense put forth by Orden instead under-
mined this goal.
From a multicultural perspective, a problem with the defense em-
ployed on Chen's behalf is that it is suffused with assumptions and
stereotypes about American and Chinese culture. At the core of the
defense is a belief that "American" and "Chinese" are "two utterly
distinct categories: 'American' does not encompass immigrant Chi-
nese."' 98 This belief underlies Pasternak's assertions (1) that a Chinese
man would act differently from an American man who learned that
his wife was having an affair; (2) that regardless of his mental health, a
Chinese man would react violently to this knowledge, especially given
the social pressure to control his family; and (3) that a Chinese man
whether living in a China that has more contact with American culture
or in the United States would not have incorporated American cul-
tural beliefs (presumably, in this context, a less violent reaction to
marital infidelity). 99 Thus, Pasternak's testimony began and ended on
the premise of an essentialized Chinese man, rooted in a culture com-
pletely foreign from American culture and inassimilable.
Pasternak seemed not to realize that his essentialization of a Chi-
nese man was rooted in his perception of himself as an "average
American." This self-identification reveals his ignorance of his own
culture - in which non-Chinese men also kill their wives - and its long-
standing, historic depiction of all Chinese as the consummate
foreigners. 100
Aspects of this premise were accepted by the prosecutor, Arthur
Rigby, and the judge, Brooklyn Supreme Court Justice Edward Pin-
cus. Rigby, for example, accepted the categorization of China as an
insular, backwards country when he asked whether China had been
liberalized since the United States normalized diplomatic relations
with the current regime. 101 Pincus, while recognizing that some Chi-
97 See infra pp. 389-90.
98 Volpp, supra note 88, at 66 (citation omitted). According to Pasternak, "American"
does include "white Anglo-Saxons, Jews, Blacks, Puerto Ricans, and Roman Catholics."
Id. at 71 n. 64 (citation omitted).
99 Id. at 67-72 (citation omitted).
100 Id. at 66 n. 43. As an historical example, Volpp quotes Justice Harlan's dissent in
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 561 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting): "There is a race so
different from our own that we do not permit those belonging to it to become citizens of
the United States. Persons belonging to it are, with few exceptions, absolutely excluded
from our country. I allude to the Chinese race."' In addition, Volpp points out that Paster-
nak's "fetishization" of the Chinese people follows the tradition of Orientalism, which de-
lineates Asians as the ultimate "other" from Westerners, including Americans. Volpp,
supra note 88, at 71-72.
101 Id. at 72 (citation omitted).
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nese immigrants might assimilate, 02 explained that the "very cogent
forceful testimony of Doctor Pasternak" led him to believe that Chen
had killed his wife because he both carried the voices of his Chinese
values with him and lacked the "safety valve" of a Chinese community
to prevent his attack on her.103 Pincus therefore convicted Chen of
second degree manslaughter and sentenced him to five years'
probation. a04
Because we, like Pasternak, Rigby, and Pincus, filter substantive
information through our own cultural lens, we must be vigilant in con-
fronting our own biases and prejudices and beware stereotyping the
individual client with whom we are working. 10 5 As Sue Bryant ad-
monishes, the culturally competent lawyer must acknowledge her own
cultural persona, analyze how it affects the client relationship, acquire
knowledge about the client's culture but apply it accurately, and inter-
act based on the actual details of the client's circumstances. 10 6 By
starting with cultural self-awareness, the lawyer is better able to un-
derstand the client's culture and the interaction of the two cultures.
Thus, the key to developing multicultural competence is cultural self-
awareness.
107
For practical guidance to develop cultural self-awareness, stu-
dents can turn to the five habits for cross-cultural lawyering that Bry-
ant and Jean Koh Peters have devised.' 0 8 The habits are designed to
102 Pincus noted that "'Were this crime committed by the defendant as someone who
was born and raised in America, or born elsewhere but primarily raised in America, even
in the Chinese American community,"' he would have found Chen guilty of first degree
manslaughter. Id. at 73 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
103 Id. at 73 and 67 n. 46 (citation omitted).
104 Id. at 64 and n. 26 (citation omitted). Indeed, the court integrated its new knowledge
of Chinese culture into the sentencing decision:
'And I must have a promise from the defendant on his honor and his honor of his
family he will abide by all of the rules and conditions that I impose .... And if he
does not obey and he violates any of these conditions, not only does he face jail, but
this will be a total loss of face.'
Id. (citation omitted)
105 Bryant, supra note 18, at 53-54; Tremblay, supra note 18, at 415-16.
106 Bryant, supra note 18, at 86-87; Tremblay, supra note 18, at 408-09.
107 Tremblay, supra note 18, at 415-16; Jacobs, supra note 18, at 395.
108 Bryant, supra note 18, at 33. The habits are: (1) Degrees of Separation and Connec-
tion (charting similarities and differences between lawyer and client and considering their
significance); (2) The Three Rings (expanding Habit I to include the legal decision-maker);
(3) Parallel Universes (exploring alternative interpretations to client behavior); (4) Red
Flags and Remedies (paying conscious attention to multicultural communication); and (5)
The Camel's Back (developing self-awareness to understand situations that make distor-
tion more likely). The five habits are the product of collaboration between Bryant and
Jean Koh-Peters that began in the early 1990s. Along the way, the collaboration has pro-
duced numerous presentations on teaching multicultural lawyering and supported Koh-
Peters' work in child advocacy, in particular as supplemental materials in her book, REPRE-
SENTING CHILDREN IN CHILD PRoTEcrIVE PROCEEDINGS: ETHICAL AND PRACTICAL
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encourage awareness cognitively, emotionally, and behaviorally. For
example, Habit 1, Degrees of Separation and Connection, focuses on
cognition and behavior: it asks students to identify similarities and
differences between the student and the client and to consider how
these aspects affect information gathering/ processing and profes-
sional distance/judgment. 10 9 By deliberately identifying similarities
and differences, the lawyer can challenge assumptions about himself
and the client, probe for facts, and lawyer based on fact. 110 Habit 5,
The Camel's Back, encourages cultural self-awareness, specifically
with regard to bias and stereotype. First, the student identifies factors
like stress, lack of control, and burn out that disrupt the lawyer-client
interaction and make bias and stereotype more likely to intrude. That
identification permits proactive efforts to minimize future interfer-
ence. Second, and in conjunction with Habit 1, the student identifies
client traits and personal traits that cause the lawyer to treat the client
with insensitivity. 1 1
Because of their concreteness, the habits for cross-cultural law-
yering and Tremblay's related heuristics add depth to the process es-
poused by Krieger and Neumann and are particularly valuable in
clinical teaching. Their use helps students to change behavior to fos-
ter better lawyering for the individual client; the culturally-aware law-
yer might hear the client's narrative more accurately and relay it to
the legal decision maker with less distortion 12 or engage the client
more fully in a decision to exploit a cultural stereotype. In addition,
Krieger and Neumann's reminder to apologize can help to repair re-
DIMENSIONS, originally published in 1997 and now in its second edition.
Habit 5 is designed specifically to address cultural self-awareness, although Habits 1
through 4 require some cultural self-awareness to work effectively. Bryant notes that other
teachers have questioned the decision to make cultural self-awareness the last habit rather
than the first. Bryant explains the decision thus: "Habit [5] can be the most difficult in
that it asks the student to face the sometimes ugly side of cultural blinders - bias and
stereotype. Moreover, the other Habits give insight and understanding that may ultimately
help students recognize bias." Bryant, supra note 18, at 77. Although I agree that engag-
ing cultural self-awareness can be a difficult process for students, my hope is that aware-
ness of the social and cognitive processes that automatically occur in human interactions
can help to diffuse the reactions to facing the "ugly side of cultural blinders" and to en-
courage students to engage in reflection and analysis, not judgment or blame. Hence my
suggestion to teach psychology explicitly as preparation for and alongside the concrete
Habits.
109 Id. at 64-68.
110 Id. at 66-68.
111 Susan Bryant & Jean Koh-Peters, Five Habits for Cross-Cultural Lawyering: A Work
in Progress 34, available at http://cleaweb.org/multiculture/multiculture.pdf (last visited on
August 20, 2004) (copy on file with author); Bryant, supra note 18, at 77-78.
112 Bryant, supra note 18, at 56 (the "primary goal is ... 'isomorphic attributions,' i.e., to
attribute same meaning to behavior and words that the person intended to convey); Shal-
leck, supra note 30, at 1751.
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spect, trust, and open communication when mistakes in multicultural
interactions occur.
Such mistakes are inevitable, sometimes because generalized cul-
tural knowledge is inaccurate on its face or as applied to a specific
client and sometimes because a behavior betraying bias or prejudice
can occur automatically, before the habits, heuristics, and newly de-
veloping instinct kick in. Thus, to better inculcate an approach to
multicultural interactions, an understanding of unconscious or auto-
matic discrimination is necessary to supplement the habits and heuris-
tics of multicultural lawyering. 113 This understanding is rooted in
cognitive and social psychology, including the formation of cognitive
categories or schemas, group behavior, and awareness of the individ-
ual's place within the dominant culture. 114
III. THE PSYCHOLOGICAL UNDERPINNINGS OF MULTICULTURAL
LAWYERING TRAINING
Why is some understanding of cognitive" 5 and social 16 psychol-
ogy necessary? Because, currently in our society, we typically do not
discriminate intentionally against people who differ from ourselves. 1" 7
113 Earlier studies have argued that, to reduce prejudice and discrimination, the per-
ceiver must be aware of her bias and be motivated to change these biases based on per-
sonal values. However, more recent studies suggest that personal motivation and self-
awareness are not the only ways to decrease prejudice. Rather, implicit positive attitudes
associated with White Americans can be weakened significantly by exposure to different
societal cues and social contexts. For example, one experiment repeatedly exposed partici-
pants to images of famous and admired Black Americans and to infamous and disliked
White Americans. The results demonstrate at least a temporary, significant reduction in
automatic racial associations. Nilanjana Dasgupta & Anthony G. Greenwald, On the Mal-
leability of Automatic Attitudes: Combating Automatic Prejudice with Images of Admired
and Disliked Individuals, 81 J. PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOL. 800 (2001), available
at http://www.apa.org/journals/psp/press-releases/november_- 2001/psp815800.html (last vis-
ited July 23, 2004). Cf. Poirier, supra note 12, at 1120-21 (need "to address head-on the
source of cognitive tagging of social roles with gender traits" to equalize women's partici-
pation in professional employment).
114 Poirier, supra note 12, at 1076, 1085.
115 Cognitive psychology concerns the study of human cognition, including attention,
perception, learning, memory, thinking, problem solving, decision making, and language.
Cognitive psychology, in ANDREW M. COLMAN, A DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOLOGY (2001),
available at http://www.oxfordreference.com/views/ENTRY.html?subview=main&en-
try=T87.e1617 (last visited February 2, 2005).
116 Social psychology concerns the study of social behavior of individuals or groups, such
as attitudes, social compliance, conformity, obedience to authority, interpersonal attrac-
tion, attribution processes, group processes, helping behavior, and non-verbal communica-
tion. Social psychology, in ANDREW M. COLMAN, A DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOLOGY (2001),
available at http://www.oxfordreference.com/views/ENTRY.htmlsubview=CMAin&en-
try=T87.e7760 (last visited February 2, 2005).
117 The APA reports that "many people who firmly believe that they have open and
favorable attitudes about people of various races and ethnicities will demonstrate that they
implicitly (unconsciously) harbor a variety of racial and ethnic prejudices that can translate
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So, lawyers treat clients in culturally insensitive ways due to "uncon-
scious or aversive racism,"1 18 which can stem from categorization er-
rors that characterize cognitive functioning' 19 and from unconscious
tendencies to favor members of social groups similar to themselves
over members of other groups. 120 Learning more about these psycho-
logical processes provides a basis for understanding how lawyers be-
have in ways that cause discrimination and, therefore, how to assess
their own beliefs and lawyering practices. 121
A lawyer who understands that he has subconscious cognitive cat-
egories - called schemas - and that the way he automatically employs
them can cause subordinating treatment might be less defensive about
acknowledging that his behavior is discriminatory. In addition, aware-
ness of how a schema is created might enable a dominant-culture law-
yer to understand how that culture influences the contents of his
schemas122 and to make conscious efforts to diversify his interactions
into subtle discriminatory behaviors." APA amicus brief, supra note 8, at 6. For example,
in one study, the participants consistently made quicker associations between faces of Afri-
can Americans and words with negative concepts - such as bomb, devil, awful - than they
did between faces of White Americans and words with positive concepts - such as peace,
joy, and love. Id. at 8.
In another study, the researchers considered how employers reacted to African-Amer-
ican sounding names (Lakisha, Jamal) compared to White American sounding names (Em-
ily, Greg) in the labor market. The researchers answered approximately 5,000 classified
advertisements, sending a set of four resumes to each posting. Each set of resumes in-
cluded two better qualified applicants and two lesser qualified applicants. The study
demonstrated two levels of discrimination: White-American sounding names received
50% more call backs than African-American sounding names, and the better resume as-
sisted White-American sounding names by 30% but only minimally assisted African-
American sounding names. Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Are Emily and
Greg More Employable than Lakisha and Jamal? A Field Experiment on Labor Market
Discrimination 2-3, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/abstractid=422902 (last visited Au-
gust 3, 2004).
Social scientists warn that unconscious racism is more likely among helping profes-
sionals. This racism occurs because "[c]ounselors often assume that their good intentions
automatically make them helpful[,]" and, therefore, do not monitor the consequences of
their behavior. RIDLEY, supra note 39, at 10-11.
118 Poirier, supra note 12, at 1073 and n.2; RIDLEY, supra note 39, at 10.
119 Krieger, supra note 18, at 1165.
120 RIDLEY, supra note 39, at 13-15. Ridley describes this group thinking as "either/or
thinking" in which we place people into single, mutually exclusive categories with the sub-
tle belief that our own group is superior, or in some cases supreme. This kind of thinking
seems to be the type engaged by Pasternak in his testimony on behalf of Dong Lu Chen.
See supra pp. 386-89.
121 RIDLEY, supra note 39, at 15.
122 Poirier, supra note 12, at 1075 (calling gender schemas "mechanisms of dominance
and subordination"). Social scientists posit that, "[i]f we meaningfully change that world -
'the larger societal context that controls these phenomena' - we can thereby change indi-
viduals' classification strategies and thus reduce both unconscious bias and its behavioral
effects." RIDLEY, supra note 39, at 15. Indeed, research indicates that "positive exposure
to members of other racial groups helps reduce such biases." Id. at 13. (citing Irene V.
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and to question the contents of his schemas in an effort to act with
more accuracy regarding members of different cultures.123 Such a
change could more easily allow the client's life, including her member-
ship in an outsider group and that group's history of subordination, to
define the legal problem, generate the solutions, and determine the
course of action.124
Let us consider then, how schemas are created and how they af-
fect our behavior: A lawyer meeting a client automatically places the
client into a cognitive category or schema. The schema itself is not
inherently bad. Rather, it is simply a means of organizing information
"to identify objects, make predictions about the future, infer the exis-
tence of unobservable traits or properties, and attribute the causation
of events. ' 125 A schema thus enables people to process information
quickly and largely automatically. 126 We create our schemas through
the experience of our daily lives, from personal encounters, second-
hand information, the media, etc. Behavior becomes associated with
race, gender, age, roles, and character traits, and event scripts 127 de-
velop through repetition.128 With regard to people, physical charac-
teristics like skin color, gender, and age are readily perceived and
therefore are more likely to become salient features in our cognitive
categories.1 29 Each category then becomes a prototype or reference
point for the people we meet, and we interact with others based on
the category that is activated.130 If we do not question the expecta-
tions evoked by the activated category, insensitive behavior can
result. 13'
Blair, The Malleability of Automatic Stereotypes and Prejudice, 6 PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. REV. 242 (2002)).
123 APA Amicus Brief, supra note 8, at 12-13 (citations omitted). Meaningful en-
counters with new racial information require the individual to develop new schema and
behaviors to cope with the new information, and if these new schema and behaviors are
effective, the individual can develop a more mature cultural identity status that allows
more accurate, autonomous multicultural interaction. Hartley & Petrucci, supra note 10,
at 167.
124 Shalleck, supra note 30, at 1749-50 (describes rebellious lawyering as using a client's
stories to solve problems by accepting the client's knowledge and experience as part of the
legal action).
125 Krieger, supra note 18, at 1188-89. Taylor-Thompson, supra note 18, at 1290-91.
126 APA Guidelines, supra note 16, at 19 (citation omitted).
127 An event script is the expectation of a "particular sequence of causally related
events." Krieger and Neumann give the example of a script for going to a restaurant:
being seated, getting a menu, giving one's order, and being served. KRIEGER & NEUMANN,
supra note 18, at 131.
128 Poirier, supra note 12, at 1093; KRIEGER & NEUMANN, supra note 18, at 131.
129 Poirier, supra note 12, at 1093-94.
130 Krieger, supra note 18, at 1200-01.
131 Indeed, a person with low levels of prejudice "must be conscious of the stereotype as
stereotype in order to avoid unconscious reliance on it." Taylor-Thompson, supra note 18,
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For example, at an AALS clinical education conference, I was
approached by a fellow clinician who, out of the blue, wanted to know
if I knew the Hong Kong - U.S. dollar exchange rate. What had struck
him most about me was not that I am a clinician or an American -
even though we were in Canada - but that I look (and am) Asian (-
American), and my ethnicity evoked a schema that said Asian appear-
ance = Hong Kong = foreigner, so he asked his question. 132
This kind of social categorization operates on an automatic level.
Based on one's own characteristics, a person sorts others into "in-
groups" sharing characteristics with the perceiver and "out-groups"
that do not. 133 The separation of others into in-groups and out-groups
further influences the way in which the perceiver views others. So, if a
lawyer has limited experience with members of different cultures,
then the behavior of those few members of the out-group culture be-
comes more salient and may be seen as representative of that cul-
ture.134 In addition, the perceiver may use her in-group as a reference
point for interpreting her own behavior as well as that of others. 135
On a subconscious level, she may exaggerate differences among
groups and favor members of her in-group over members of out-
groups. 136 "In-groups are more highly valued, more trusted, and en-
gender greater cooperation as opposed to competition, and those with
the strongest in-group affiliation also show the most prejudice."'1 37
A problem with schemas is that they are susceptible to uncon-
scious biases and stereotyping. A stereotype is "a generalized descrip-
tion of a group of people that has usually developed over time on the
basis of cross-cultural interactions.' 1 38 Because a stereotype can be-
at 1289. Cf. KRIEGER & NEUMANN, supra note 18, at 180-81 (advising attorneys to evalu-
ate credibility of witnesses by considering schemas used in processing facts)
132 1 didn't know the answer.
133 APA Guidelines, supra note 16, at 19 (citation omitted).
134 The presence of only one member of an out-group makes that one person's presence
more distinctive and memorable so that a stronger schema can result. Krieger, supra note
18, at 1192, 1194-95.
135 Lee, supra note 56, at 10-11.
136 APA Guidelines, supra note 16, at 19-20 (citations omitted). "Prejudice occurs when
a person takes his or her own group as the positive reference point from which to judge
other people negatively." Lee, supra note 56, at 10.
137 APA Guidelines, supra note 16, at 19-20 (citations omitted). Taylor-Thompson de-
scribes a chilling example of group-related bias in a study regarding perceptions of a crimi-
nal defendant's honesty or guilt. The participants watched a simulated robbery trial and
then had to reach a unanimous verdict and, if that verdict was of guilt, recommend a sen-
tence. The "defendant" did not testify at trial, and the participants saw him only when he
entered a plea of not guilty. The study determined that majority white juries were less
likely to believe the defendant to be honest when he was Latino and also more likely to
convict with recommendations for the maximum sentence. Taylor-Thompson, supra note
18, at 1293 (describing study conducted by Dolores Perez in 1993).
138 APA Guidelines, supra note 16, at 11 (citation omitted). Familiarity with a stereo-
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come ingrained in a schema, the stereotype can create an unconscious
expectation that a specific individual will behave in conformity with
the stereotype. 139 If the expectation is distorted or illusory - as it was
in the case of Dong Lu Chen - then the perceiver might unconsciously
be biased in the way she interacts with the client. 40
When the client comes from a culture different from the lawyer's,
the risk of stereotyping is greater.141 Experience with members of the
client's culture that was seen as negative is more readily recalled, 142
and thus the lawyer runs the risk of expecting negative behavior and
finding it, whether or not it actually occurred.143 In addition, the law-
yer is more likely to attribute behaviors of the out-group client to
character traits if the behaviors fit the expectation and to situational
factors if the behavior seems aberrant.1 44 Then, the lawyer might start
to label the client who does not return phone calls as rude or uncaring
instead of considering that work, personal, child-related, or other fac-
tors might cause the delay.1 45
Given these problems with cognitive schemas, one might become
discouraged, wondering whether we could ever become culturally
competent. Explicit discussion of the schemas and stereotypes we
hold, however, might enable us to uncover the hidden assumptions. 46
Thus, the teaching of nonracist behaviors, coupled with cognitive and
type should not imply prejudice, which is the "endorsement of negative attitudes toward
and stereotypes about groups." Id. at 21; Taylor-Thompson, supra note 18, at 1291.
139 Poirier, supra note 12, at 1098-99; APA amicus brief, supra note 8, at 10 (citations
omitted)
140 Krieger, supra note 18, at 1198.
141 Id. at 1204.
142 Id. at 1192. By contrast, the lawyer typically has more data about members of her
culture so that she is able to understand the complexity of factors at play in an interaction
with another in-group client. Id. at 1194-95. Hence the habit of parallel universes: think-
ing of alternative, often situational explanations for behavior.
143 Id. at 1208.
144 Id. at 1205-07. For example, "failures" by members of an out-group are more likely
to be attributed to the person than to the situation. But when a failure occurs with mem-
bers of an in-group, the in-group observer has greater familiarity with the group and more
data about the groups from which to posit complex external factors leading to failure. Id.
at 1207.
145 Jean Koh Peters tells the story of a student who was unable to reach his/her client.
The student dutifully, if rotely, recited alternative explanations for this failure (Habit 3)
but clearly did not consider them credible. Finally, on the day of court, the client did
appear, and the student learned that she had given birth in the interim. Jean Koh Peters,
Access to Justice: The Social Responsibility of Lawyers: Habit, Story, and Delight, Essential
Tools for the Public Service Advocate, 7 WASH. U. L.J. & POLICY 17, 19 (2001).
146 Taylor-Thompson, supra note 18, at 1288-89. At BCLAB, a common student as-
sumption is that a client will not want to discuss her mental illness, even if it is the basis for
a disability claim. Consequently, in supervision, we will discuss this concern, including
questioning whether it is the student's own discomfort with mental illness, grounded in
cultural stigma, which is the basis for concern. Typically, once the student has met the
client, the student will be surprised at the client's openness about the illness.
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social psychology, can help lawyers to examine their values, biases,
and prejudices and therefore to change their behaviors and attitudes.
To consider how schema are created and can affect behavior, let
us review the situation of my student working with the public housing
tenant. When the student began the clinic, her experience with legal
clients was scarce. At that time, her schema of a client was her
mother - a white, small-business owner, married to a minister. The
student could not imagine her mother lying, especially to her lawyer,
or being financially irresponsible. Thus, her encounter with the client
who lied was a startling event. The student might incorporate this ex-
perience into her existing client schema. Her client schema might now
recognize that clients might lie or, more specifically, that poor, black
American clients might lie. The next time she were to encounter a
poor, black American client, sh6 would automatically recollect this
schema. That recollection might give rise to an expectation that this
new client would lie. If, however, the student were to recognize that
such an expectation might be generalized and generalized on too little
information, then she might act differently toward this next client.
She might, for example, consciously remind herself that this is a differ-
ent individual, she might remember the discussion we had about why
the earlier client might have lied, and she might prepare a more
nonjudgmental response should the current client lie.
IV. TEACHING CULTURAL SELF-AWARENESS AS PART OF
MULTICULTURAL LAWYERING TRAINING
An understanding of social and cognitive psychology can provide
a foundation on which to develop cultural self- awareness, which is
essential to multicultural competence. 147 Cultural self-awareness en-
ables the lawyer to understand that her culture - including ingrained
"beliefs, values, and attitudes" 148 - shapes her unconscious assump-
tions and influences her interactions with people of different cul-
tures. 149 Through cultural self-awareness, a lawyer can develop an
understanding of her own heritage, which will "provide[ ] a firm base
for understanding and respecting the world views of people with dif-
147 Arredondo & Arciniega, supra note 16, at 266; PEDERSEN, supra note 16, at 203; and
WEHRLY, supra note 22, at 48. Bill Ong Hing has commented that recognizing how "per-
sonal identification differences," such as class, race, ethnicity, gender, disability, and age,
(all part of a student's cultural self-awareness) affect lawyering seems common sensical but
nonetheless requires training. Bill Ong Hing, Raising Personal Identification Issues of
Class, Race, Ethnicity, Gender, Sexual Orientation, Physical Disability, and Age in Law-
yering Courses, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1807, 1808-10 (1993).
148 APA Guidelines, supra note 16, at 23-24.
149 Id. at 23-25; and WEHRLY, supra note 22, at 109-10.
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ferent ethnic, cultural, and racial heritages.' 150
To develop cultural self-awareness competency, a student must
work through three domains: attitudes and beliefs, knowledge, and
behavioral skills.151 The framework presented below is not linear in
nature but rather identifies issues that a student encounters as he ac-
knowledges himself as a cultural being. Permeating this framework is
the premise that "unlearning racism [or oppression] is the first step a
[lawyer] must take on the path of developing cultural awareness."'1 52
By oppression, I mean not prejudice, which is "negative attitudes, be-
liefs, and intentions,"'1 53 but behavior that perpetuates social inequal-
ity.154 To perpetuate social inequality, the actor must have power,
whether perceived or real.155 Power can come by virtue of member-
ship in a cultural group. In a lawyer-client relationship, the lawyer
holds power by virtue of her role and cultural dynamics. 156
This distinction between intentions and effects is crucial to devel-
oping multicultural competency, as it enables the lawyer to focus on
behavior (hence the third domain), which is easier to change than the
150 WEHRLY, supra note 22, at 110. The premise of cultural self-awareness is that appre-
ciation of the significance of culture in one's own life allows one to appreciate the signifi-
cance of culture in another person's life. Thus, "It is not possible to be a competent
counselor without being culturally competent." Robert T. Carter, Becoming Racially and
Culturally Competent: The Racial-Cultural Counseling Laboratory, J. MULTICULTURAL
COUNSELING AND DEV., at 20, 21 (2003).
151 ROBINSON & HOWARD-HAMILTON, supra note 56, at 272-73; and SUE & SUE, supra
note 16, at 224-25.
152 Lee, supra note 56, at 16. Lee Anne Bell, Theoretical Foundations for Social Justice
Education, in TEACHING FOR DIVERSITY AND SOCIAL JUSTICE: A SOURCEBOOK 3, 4 (Ma-
rianne Adams et al. eds. 1997) I substitute the term "oppression" for racism because my
perspective on multicultural competence includes cultural differences other than those lim-
ited to racial and ethnic groups. Use of the term oppression "emphasize[s] the pervasive
nature of social inequality woven throughout social institutions as well as embedded within
individual consciousness" and encompasses the problems of intersectionality of gender,
class, etc. Id. at 4-5.
153 RIDLEY, supra note 39, at 17-18. An example of racial prejudice is the "assumption
that traits and abilities are determined biologically and one race is therefore inherently
superior." Lee, supra note 56, at 12. A person might hold stereotyped images in her
schema, but if she does not endorse the stereotype, then she is not exhibiting prejudice.
Taylor-Thompson, supra note 18, at 1291.
154 Bell, supra note 152, at 5-6 (explaining that oppression manifests through different
kinds of discrimination such as racism, sexism, classism, heterosexism, ageism, and able-
ism); see RIDLEY, supra note 39, at 17, 20-21 (advocating determination of racism from the
consequences, not the causes, of the behavior).
155 RIDLEY, supra note 39, at 21-22; WEHRLY, supra note 22, at 167-68. Unfortunately,
the presence of power also makes developing multicultural competence more difficult.
The "persistent nature of [cultural] stereotypes and misinformation and a keen desire to
preserve in-group status" make the powerholder more resistant to exploring social inequal-
ity and acknowledging her own role in maintaining that inequality. Hartley & Petrucci,
supra note 10, at 165.
156 WEHRLY, supra note 22, at 168.
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underlying, automatic assumptions ingrained in our schema 157 and to
work through the defensiveness that can accompany discussions of op-
pression, both historical and contemporary.
First, the student ponders her own attitudes and beliefs: Does
she recognize that she has a culture? 158 Does she believe that cultural
self-awareness is important? Is she aware of how her culture shapes
her attitudes, values, biases, and assumptions about lawyering? Does
she recognize the limits of her own multicultural competency? What
makes her comfortable or uncomfortable working with cultural simi-
larity and difference? 159 This domain is probably the most difficult for
law students to develop, as law students tend to favor reason over
emotions.160 In addition, society and legal training acculturate stu-
dents into blindness toward cultural differences and the privileges that
can accompany group membership. 161 However, examination of one's
attitudes and beliefs - and the emotions that examination can arouse -
can pay dividends for client interaction by helping the lawyer to de-
velop empathy for clients, which in turn can enhance rapport and in-
formation gathering, 162 to understand client goals and interests, and to
provide more comprehensive representation.
157 RIDLEY, supra note 22, at 24-25.
158 Members of the dominant white American culture may not recognize that such a
culture exists. In many instances, "Whites do not see themselves as White. Often, Ameri-
can or human being is used as a descriptor." ROBINSON & HOWARD-HAMILTON, supra
note 56, at 278 (emphasis in original) (citation omitted). De-racializing the culture can
occur because "Whites in the United States learn that they are entitled to privileges associ-
ated with being White and learn to deny or distort race-related reality in order to protect
the status quo." Lee, supra note 56, at 51. Thus, an early step for members of a dominant
culture is acknowledging the prevalence of cultural discrimination in the United States. Id.
at 16-18.
159 PEDERSEN, supra note 16, at 203; and ROBINSON & HOWARD-HAMILTON, supra note
56, at 272-73.
160 Marjorie A. Silver, Love, Hate, and Other Emotional Interference in the Lawyer/Cli-
ent Relationship, 6 CLIN. L. REV. 259, 278 (1999). Silver notes that on the Myers-Brigg
scale, lawyers tend to fall in the thinker category rather than the feeler category.
161 ROBINSON & HOWARD-HAMILTON, supra note 56, at 61, 68. See Lee, supra note 56,
at 13-14 (describing cognitive dissonance White Americans can experience in trying to rec-
oncile their receipt of benefits and privileges in a society that discriminates against racial
and ethnic minorities and their efforts to rationalize that dissonance by denying their par-
ticipation in racism). Indeed, legal education long has ignored the effects of race and cul-
ture on the lawyer-client relationship, preferring instead to consider race and culture as a
strategic tool, to be used, for example, in jury selection, Hartley & Petrucci, supra note 10,
at 165, or developing a narrative to appeal to the fact-finder, KRIEGER & NEUMANN, supra
note 18, at 158 (awareness of the likely schema of one's audience helps the lawyer to shape
his/her narrative).
162 See Laurel E. Fletcher & Harvey M. Weinstein, When Students Lose Perspective:
Clinical Supervision and the Management of Empathy, 9 CLIN. L. REV. 135, 136 (2002)
(explaining that empathy helps information gathering because "the lawyer is called upon to
feel as the other does not only to solicit information but also to understand more fully the
import of the speaker's words").
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Students from the dominant culture may not recognize that they
have a culture. For example, during a discussion on culture, a white
male student told me that he did not think he had a culture as a white
male. When I asked, he identified sources of values, attitudes, and
beliefs (his family, his geographic base, and schools he had attended)
but did not think that they added up to a unitary, coherent culture. I
asked then about people whom he thought have such a culture. As
the student hails from Texas, he named Mexican immigrants. We then
considered how someone from Mexico might respond if asked to iden-
tify her culture, first while in Mexico and then again when trans-
planted to the United States. We also considered why another person
might identify the immigrant's culture as Mexican. The student then
realized that awareness of culture is easier when one stands outside
the dominant culture. Indeed, the student did not consider himself to
be a Texan culturally, as he is not a cowboy or rancher and had been
more interested in education than his peers. Rather, he feels comfort-
able in Boston even though he often is perceived as a Texan in Bos-
ton. Thus, the student recognized, first, that, even though he
perceives nuance and differentiation in his own world view and its
development, those nuances and differences might not be visible to
others, and, second, that his world view is recognizable as a culture to
others and therefore ultimately to himself.
Second, the student consciously considers specific knowledge.
The focus on specific knowledge - which can be drawn from fieldwork,
personal experience, simulations, readings, etc. - leads to processing
the information gleaned 163 and then to the formulation of abstract
concepts and generalizations that will assist the students in new situa-
tions. 164 Some examples of the different kinds of knowledge to study
follow:
With regard to her own culture, she might consider how the me-
dia portrays homeless people, alcoholics, women, the elderly,
and others she is more likely to encounter as clients in the clinic.
With regard to "how oppression, racism, discrimination, and
stereotyping are perceived"' 165 by members of different cultures,
she might consider reports indicating the different perceptions
of the prevalence of discrimination in the United States by mem-
bers of different racial groups.
With regard to her own style of lawyering, she might recognize
163 Journals and in-class discussion are useful for this purpose. Lee Anne Bell & Pat
Griffin, Designing Social Justice Education Courses, in TEACHING FOR DIVERSITY AND SO-
CIAL JUSTICE: A SOURCEBOOK 44, 56-58 (Marianne Adams et al. eds. 1997).
164 Id. at 56-58.
165 PEDERSEN, supra note 16, at 203.
Spring 20051
HeinOnline  -- 11 Clinical L. Rev. 399 2004-2005
CLINICAL LAW REVIEW
that it is "culturally learned and culturally specific,"' 66 with its
own impact on her clients and others. 167 For example, she might
consider how a preference for chronological story telling may
clash with another culture's preference for narrative or how her
office's policy of scheduling interviews during 9-to-5 business
hours affects poorer clients who are hourly wage earners.
Another way to explore this domain more comprehensively is to
start with personal experience, looking for patterns of behavior or of
client reactions and then to trace the patterns to their cultural sources.
For example, I consider my own experience at a workshop on cross-
cultural supervision. We engaged in an exercise in which each at-
tendee listed a number of supervisees with whom each had a good
relationship and supervisees with whom each had a challenging rela-
tionship. The trainees then considered each category of supervisees
for patterns. As I considered my lists, I realized that I most frequently
had difficulty supervising white male students. The specific difficulties
varied from student to student, and I could recall very good relation-
ships with white male students, but the pattern was clear: my most
difficult supervisory relationships were with white men.
This pattern led me to consider first what in my experience made
it harder for me to work with white men. Looking first at my family
of origin, I realized that its Confucian-based culture that inculcated
deference to men as authority figures might make it harder for me to
assert my own authority. Moving beyond my family, I further realized
that, as a group (Taiwanese Americans), we all further deferred to
white men in particular as powerholders, and that this experience
might cause additional interference with the exercise of authority. In-
deed, I then recalled an incident in which a white male student asked
me on the first day of a legal research and writing class for all the
writing assignments upfront as he did not need to attend class because
he had won awards for legal writing.168 Because of that incident,
might I be hesitant to supervise? Or too aggressive in supervision in
an effort to preempt anticipated insubordination? I also considered
my views toward white law students in particular. When a white male
student demonstrated poorer analytical or writing skills, was I guilty
of holding him to a higher standard because of an assumption that
white students overall have better analytical and writing skills than
students of color at the school?
I also reviewed aspects of white American male culture that
might affect the students' interaction with me. When I raised con-
166 Id.
167 ROBINSON & HOWARD-HAMILTON, supra note 56, at 272-73.
168 Of course, I denied his request.
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cerns with empathy in a white male student's interaction with a client,
did he dismiss these concerns as "touchy feely" because I am a
woman? Was a student resentful of the emphasis on client interaction
skills when previously he had earned praise for his classroom work?
Were stereotypes about Asian women (usually not authority figures,
litigators, or law professors) and assumptions about age and experi-
ence (yes, I look younger than I really am, and I am the youngest and
most junior supervisor in my clinic program) affecting their reception
of my supervision?
Armed with these considerations, I can reevaluate my approach
to supervision generally and to white male students specifically in
ways that take into account my culture, their culture, and the interac-
tion of the two. Possibilities include: are my automatic lawyering ex-
pectations of white male students unfair? Am I transferring prior bad
experiences with white men on them? Do I need to develop more
comfort and confidence in my own authority? Do I need to be more
explicit, with examples, of my expectations and of their expectations?
Do I ask about concerns with our multicultural supervision?
Third and finally, building on her knowledge, the student ac-
quires skills that enhance her multicultural competence and seeks out
opportunities to practice them. The skills help her to continue the
process of understanding herself as a cultural being, limitations and
all, and to develop a nonracist identity.169 As noted above, discrimi-
nation typically occurs through the consequences of behavior, not
through the intentions of the actor. Thus, by identifying specific be-
haviors that might be oppressive and nonoppressive, a lawyer can re-
inforce nonoppressive behaviors and fair practices. 170 Bryant and
Koh-Peter's Five Habits and Tremblay's heuristics can be valuable
here to help students anticipate cultural differences and to acquire
good behaviors, which can be reinforced and replicated through simu-
lations, classroom discussion, supervision and fieldwork. 171 And when
missteps occur, Krieger and Neumann's reminder to apologize
promptly can help to repair damage to a relationship and perhaps lead
to better information on how to adjust one's behavior in the future.
169 PEDERSEN, supra note 16, at 203; ROBINSON & HOWARD-HAMILTON, supra note 56,
at 272-73.
170 RIDLEY, supra note 39, at 25-26.
171 "To prevent a relapse into racism, nonracist behaviors and fair practices must be
acquired, reinforced, and carefully monitored." Id. at 26. The practices espoused by Bry-
ant, Koh-Peters, and Tremblay are also useful in steps one and two of Krieger and Neu-
mann's process of developing an instinct for multicultural situations.
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V. CONCLUSION
As a legal services attorney, I have attended numerous diversity
training programs. 72 In retrospect, the superficiality of most pro-
grams is reminiscent of the reasoning of the Grutter opinion, being
perfunctory nods to the market reality that legal services clients are
frequently more diverse than the service providers. As a result, most
programs fell short, being one-time, three-hour workshops in which
the attendees mouthed platitudes about diversity, looked bored, and
sometimes participated in an exercise, usually to identify individual
cultural group memberships. There was often little explanation of the
purpose of the exercise, little time for reflection and processing, and
no specifics as to cultural knowledge or skills to develop. 173 Nor was
their discussion about implicit discrimination, that gap between good
intentions and discriminatory outcomes. Because the goal of the
training was superficial (better service provision to clients who are dif-
ferent) there was no discussion of what multicultural competence
should entail affectively, cognitively, or behaviorally.
These experiences lead me to suggest some changes to diversity
training for lawyers and law students. The training should not be
about learning racial etiquette in a diverse economy but about learn-
ing multicultural competence with the explicit goal of empowering
culturally different clients (and colleagues) as part of a larger effort to
end discrimination. Being explicit about the goal 74 would allow a
clearer, more realistic framework for understanding the never-ending
progression toward multicultural competence and a basis for question-
ing and challenging the techniques and experiences we encounter on
that journey. As the framework is based on psychosocial concepts
that most lawyers are probably unfamiliar with, introductory training
172 For a critical review of diversity training, see generally ELISABETH LASCH-QUINN,
RACE EXPERTS: How RACIAL ETIQUETTE, SENSITIVITY TRAINING, AND NEW AGE THER-
APY HIJACKED THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION 161-93 (2001).
173 Pedersen identifies three ways in which multicultural competency training can fail:
(1) an exclusive focus on awareness of one's own cultural biases and prejudices, without
training on what to do with this awareness; (2) an overemphasis on acquiring knowledge of
cultures without linkage to skills and behaviors; and (3) an overemphasis on skills, which
can be applied in culturally inappropriate ways if not linked to awareness and knowledge.
PAUL PEDERSEN, A HANDBOOK FOR DEVELOPING MULTICULTURAL AWARENESS 26 (2d
ed. 1995).
174 Some educators advise us to give our students the theory up front because
theory enables us to think clearly about our intentions and the means we use to
actualize them in the classroom. It provides a framework for making choices about
what we do and how, and for distinguishing among different approaches.... [A]t its
best, theory also provides a framework for questioning and challenging our practices
and creating new approaches as we encounter inevitable problems of cooptation,
resistance, insufficient knowledge, and changing social conditions ... 
Bell, supra note 152, at 4.
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in these concepts also would be beneficial - especially in overcoming
defensiveness and denial about a personal role in perpetuating dis-
crimination and in developing greater consciousness of the societal
and institutional structures that may make individual cultural differ-
ences more salient.
This article attempts to provide some of the concepts, theory, and
framework underlying multicultural competence training for the pur-
pose of social justice, as developed by mental health practitioners. 175
By naming the goal - combating discriminatory behavior by lawyers -
and laying bare the psychology that can cause us all unintentionally to
discriminate against members of different cultural groups, I hope to
engage law students and clinicians in a frank, structured, and ongoing
journey toward multicultural competence.
The focus here is on the first step of that journey - the develop-
ment of a culturally self-aware lawyer who is conscious of her own
biases and values without favoring them over another's; aware of how
his own values and biases affect clients from a different cultural group;
comfortable with cultural difference , sensitive to circumstances that
make it appropriate for a client to change lawyers; and aware of her
attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors that may be oppressive. 176 From this
base, the lawyer can actively develop an understanding of her client's
culture and skills that will enable her to lawyer with multicultural
competence.
175 The APA boasts, with justification, that mental health practitioners take cultural
competency more seriously than do lawyers, for they are "driven by widespread awareness
of treatment inadequacies for minorities" APA Amicus Brief, supra note 8, at 26, and view
cultural competency as the responsibility of every practitioner. See generally APA Guide-
lines, supra note 16.
176 SUE & SUE, supra note 16, at 228-29.
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